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Abstract: 
 
The empirical literature on the determinants of risk disclosures offers mixed results. This 
complicates efforts among stakeholders to understand the factors affecting firms’ decision to 
report risk information. The aim of our paper is to analyse the findings of 42 empirical 
studies using a meta-analysis. We examine whether differences in the findings are 
attributable to random error or due to legal and institutional systems, uncertainty avoidance, 
the disclosure regime (mandatory versus voluntary), industry types and the proxies of 
corporate characteristics. We find that all moderators affect the relationship strength 
between corporate size and risk reporting. Legal system, disclosure regime, industry types 
and leverage ratio measurement moderate the association between leverage ratio and risk 
disclosure. Industry types and uncertainty avoidance level affect the relationship between 
profitability and risk disclosure. Finally, the association between risk factor and risk 
disclosure is moderated by industry types.  We discuss the implications of our findings and 
offer suggestions for future research. 
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The Association between Risk Disclosure and Firm 
Characteristics: A Meta-Analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although business risks have always existed, major corporate scandals have led to an 
increase interest in risk reporting and risk management (Oliveira, Rodriguez and Craig, 
2013). Fuller and Jensen (2002: p. 43) argue that  “Trying to mask the uncertainty that is 
inherent in every business is like pushing on a balloon; smoothing out today’s bumps means 
they will only pop up somewhere else tomorrow, often with catastrophic results”. Therefore, 
studying risk disclosure is crucial for the well-functioning of capital markets (Deumes, 
2008). 
Given this importance, risk disclosure has attracted the interest of several accounting 
regulators worldwide including The American Accounting Association (AAA), Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and accounting professional bodies (e.g. The Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW)) (Schrand and Elliott, 1998 and 
Elshandidy et al, 2013). These institutions suggest that there is a risk information gap 
between firms and shareholders and companies are providing insufficient risk information in 
their annual reports (Schrand and Elliott, 1998). Therefore, understanding management 
incentives for risk disclosure represents a relevant information for standard-setters “when 
they consider how to mandate narrative risk reporting in the non-financial statements of 
firms' annual reports” (Miihkinen, 2012, p. 3).  
Linsely and Shrives (2000) argue that companies become exposed to more volatility and 
uncertainties. Accordingly, they develop sophisticated ways to identify measure and manage 
risk. Although these developments, investors know little about firm’s risks and risk 
management and the risk information gap still exist between companies and their 
stakeholders (Linsley & Shrives, 2006). Lee (2012) emphasises that companies need 
3 
 
freedom in reporting their risk information when responding to the stock market 
requirements. Accordingly, firm’s narrative disclosure disclosure may represent an 
important tool to communicate risk information to investors. Recent research shows 
variations between companies in reporting risk information (Elshandidy et al., 2013 and 
Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). (Miihkinen, 2012, p. 1) argues that “it is difficult to evaluate 
detailed risk guidance in an environment where firms have several disclosure motives”. This 
raises the following important research question: What are the determinants of risk 
information? 
During the last decade, the determinants of risk reporting practices have attracted major 
interests in accounting and finance literature (Oliveira et al., 2013). However, results 
reported are mixed. Solomon, Solomon, Norton, and Joseph (2000: 30) suggest that “there 
has been little attempt by the academic community to summarize developments in risk 
disclosure”. Linsley and Shrives (2006: 400) state that “it would also be beneficial to adopt 
multi-disciplinary approaches as insights drawn from areas such as sociology may present 
alternative methodological approaches to assist future risk disclosure research”.  In this 
regard, the meta-analysis technique has been widely applied in social sciences (e.g. Theil, 
2002; Wåhlberg, 2008) and it is recently used in disclosure literature (e.g. Khlif and Souissi, 
2010). Compared to narrative reviews, this technique allows the integration and 
reconciliation between conflicting findings which leads to more consistent conclusions 
(Rosenthal, 1991). Therefore, the main objective of this study is to empirically analyse the 
findings of prior empirical risk disclosure studies using the meta-analysis technique. This 
should help in achieving a quantitative generalization of these findings which is not possible 
by a narrative literature review.  
Our objective in this study is to advance understanding  the determinants of risk disclosure 
by conducting a meta-analysis of the findings of 42 empirical disclosure studies that 
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examine specifically this topic.. We also aim to determine whether the variability of findings 
across studies is due to differences in different definitions of explanatory variables, or due to 
differences in research settings (civil versus common law countries and the level of 
uncertainty avoidance), disclosure regime,  type of industries examined and journal quality. 
The meta-analysis has been widely applied in accounting and finance literature with respect 
to the determinants of voluntary disclosure literature (e.g., Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010 and Khlif and Souissi, 2010). Our study 
complements this stream of research by focusing on risk disclosure. Our paper also 
complements prior syntheses of risk reporting that have taken the form of narrative reviews 
(e.g. Oliveira et al., 2013). While narrative reviews are important, they might be vulnerable 
to biased representations of a body of literature and easily lead to false inferences (Drees 
and Heugens, 2013). Therefore, a quantitative synthesis of the determinants of risk 
disclosure would help in understanding the factors that affect firms’ decision to report risk 
information 
We contribute to disclosure studies by not only presenting an overview discussion on the 
determinants of risk disclosure, but also by using a meta-analysis of the reported findings on 
these determinants. Our paper is the first study that applied the meta-analysis which 
qualitatively combines all the available empirical findings on the impact of firm 
characteristics on risk disclosure and thus, this technique can be a catalyst for a quantitative 
generalisation on the factors affecting risk disclosure. The paper also is being the first study 
to explain the potential reasons for the mixed findings in the risk disclosure literature by 
identifying the factors that moderate the relationship strength between firm characteristics 
and risk disclosure.  
 We find that corporate size, leverage ratio, profitability and risk factors are positively 
associated with risk reporting. Interestingly, we find that the association between corporate 
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size and risk reporting is affected by all moderators. Legal system, disclosure regime, 
industry types and leverage ratio measurement moderate the association between leverage 
ratio and risk disclosure. Industry types and uncertainty avoidance level affect the 
relationship between profitability and risk disclosure. Finally, the association between risk 
factor and risk disclosure is moderated industry types. Our results emphasise the need to 
consider legal and institutional characteristics and industry types when  one analyses the 
determinants of risk disclosure. 
The next section presents the motives for risk dislcosure. Section 3 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes data selection. Section 5 
presents the research methodology. Section 6 reports the findings. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Risk disclosure definition and motives for risk disclosure 
Risk reporting is defined as a set of information communicated in financial statements 
dealing with managers’ estimates, judgments, reliance on market-based accounting policies 
such as impairment, derivative hedging, financial instruments, economic, political, financial, 
management risks and internal control risks (Hassan, 2009; Miihkinen, 2012). This 
definition is in line with others suggested by several authors (e.g. Schrand and Elliott, 1998) 
who argue that risk disclosure is all types of information communicated in financial 
statements  dealing with business uncertainties.  
Two streams of theories have been employed to explain why firms communicate risk 
information [Linsley & Shrives, 2000]. These streams include both the economic theory 
approach and social and political theory approach (Hassan, 2009; Iatridis, 2008;  Oliveira et 
al. 2013). 
The economic theory approach relies on self-interest and profit maximization of economic 
agents and uses the following frameworks to explain risk disclosure including agency 
theory, political costs theory, signalling theory, and proprietary costs theory (Hassan, 2009; 
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Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010), while the social and political approach suggests to 
understand the motivations of risk disclosure, it is necessary to understand the  political and 
social relationships linking firm to stakeholders in the society (Oliveira et al. 2013). Based 
on these theories, we will try in the next section to develop hypotheses dealing with the 
effect of some corporate characteristics and risk disclosure. 
3.  Hypotheses development 
 
Several variables have been used in empirical literature to explain the determinants of risk 
reporting including corporate characteristics (e.g. size, leverage, risk factor) and corporate 
governance attributes (e.g. ownership concentration, board independence). To assess the 
effect of some explanatory variables on voluntary risk reporting, it is necessary to have a 
sufficiently large number of studies that have empirically addressed a particular variable.  
Initially we collect information for several variables commonly used in the studies examined 
including corporate characteristics (size, leverage, profitability and risk factor, multi-
nationality, industry, auditor type) and corporate governance (ownership concentration, 
board size, board independence).  Our choice of corporate size, leverage, profitability and 
risk factor to meta-analyse the determinants of voluntary risk reporting is mainly influenced 
by the fact that the number of observations obtained for these variables exceeds at least 19 
allowing a reliable statistical analysis and tests for moderating factors.  
Several theories have been used to justify the potential impact of corporate size, leverage 
ratio, corporate profitability and risk factor on voluntary risk reporting. These include 
agency, proprietary costs, legitimacy and resources-based perspectives theories. In this 
section, we review studies that have examined the relationship between risk disclosure and 
the above explanatory variables that have received much attention in financial reporting 
research over the last decade. We also develop hypotheses with respect to each moderating 
factor. 
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  3.1. Corporate size 
Large firms tend to be more complex and have more varied operations. These characteristic 
implies higher risk levels which translate into higher information asymmetry among 
investors (Deumes and Knechel, 2008). According to agency theory, risk reporting may 
reduce agency costs and information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1983).  In addition, large firms are generally characterised by greater 
levels of public visibility implying higher public scrutiny among stakeholders (Amran et al., 
2009).  According to legitimacy theory, the disclosure of risk information will help 
stakeholders in the evaluation of potential litigation risks and potential reputation damages. 
This implies that firm has a legitimating process to preserve corporate reputation, reduce 
corporate risk and signal its legitimacy (Oliveira et al., 2011). Finally, large firms may enjoy 
economies of scale in developing, implementing, and reporting information regarding 
market, management and internal control risks since they have more resources to afford 
disclosure production costs comparative to smaller ones (Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007). 
The empirical evidence on the effect corporate size on voluntary risk reporting is mixed. 
While there are research findings showing a negative association between firm size and risk 
reporting (e.g., Lajili and Zegal, (2005 and Hill and Short. 2009), other research findings 
show a significant positive association between firm size and risk reporting (e.g., Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006, Abraham and Cox, 2007, Deumes and Knechel, 2008, Barakat and 
Hussainey, 2013, Elshandidy et al, 2013, Ntim et al, 2013). . Other studies find no 
association between both variables (e.g. Doyle, Ge and McVay, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins,William and Kinney Jr, 2007). Given these mixed evidences, the following non-
directional hypothesis is formulated: 
H01: there is an association between corporate size and voluntary risk reporting. 
8 
 
3.2. Leverage 
Firms characterised by high leverage ratio tend to be more risky and speculative (Oliveira et 
al. 2011).  Agency theory suggests that agency costs increase with high leverage ratio 
(Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). Debtholders of highly leveraged firms may introduce more 
restrictive covenants into debt contract which will increase agency and monitoring costs. 
Risk disclosure made by management concerning market, credit and internal control risk 
may play a critical role in mitigating creditors’ concerns about the solvency of their firm and 
its capabilities to generate enough cash flows in the future (Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 
2009). Signalling theory posits also that managers voluntarily disclose risk information 
when they have a high leverage ratio to signal to investors and creditors the firms’ abilities 
to meet short term and long term commitments (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).   
Empirical evidence on the relationship between leverage ratio and voluntary risk reporting is 
inconclusive.  While there are research findings showing a positive relationship between 
leverage and risk disclosure (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007, Deumes and Knechel, 2008, 
Itardis, 2008), other research papers did not find significant association between the two 
variables (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012, Ntim et al. 2013, Miihkinen, 2012).  Given these 
mixed evidence, the following non-directional hypothesis is formulated: 
H02: there is an association between leverage ratio and voluntary risk reporting. 
3.3. Profitability 
Signalling theory is useful for describing managers’ behaviour for revealing information to 
the stock market in order to avoid any undervaluation of their shares (Giner, 1997).  
Elshandidy et al (2013) argue that high-profitability firms have greater incentives to signal 
the quality of their performance and their ability to manage risks successfully. Risk 
disclosure may reduce uncertainty regarding future cash-flows and economic environment 
which will have a positive effect on firm’s shares.  In addition, managers are inclined to 
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communicate risk-related information to improve the corporation’s image and inform 
stakeholders to signal their managerial skills in managing risks (Iatridis, 2008).  Moreover, 
communicating risk information may reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders implying less agency costs. By contrast, Skinner (1994) suggests that bad 
performance increases managers’ incentives to disclosure risk-related information to ensure 
investors about firm’s future prospects and avoid the adverse effect of litigation risks.   
With respect to internal control weaknesses reporting, Deumes and Knechel (2008) suggest 
that profitable firms may have more resources to communicate such type of information. 
However, given the good financial performance realised by firm, shareholders will 
underestimate inherent risk and thus neglect such type of disclosure implying less incentives 
from management to increase internal control risk reporting.  
 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between profitability and voluntary risk reporting is 
also inconclusive.  While Mohobbot (2005) and Miihkinen (2012) find a positive 
relationship between profitability and risk disclosure Lajili and Zegal (2005) and Oliveira et 
al.(2011) find a negative association between the two variables. 
Given these mixed evidences, we formulate the following non-directional hypothesis: 
 
H03: there is an association between profitability and voluntary risk reporting. 
3.4. Risk factor 
Systematic risk, as measured by the beta or the risk of bankruptcy could also be an 
important variable to explain risk-related disclosure. Agency theory suggests that managers 
may publish risk information in order to reduce information asymmetry between insiders 
and outsiders and hence reducing information asymmetry (Elshandidy et al, 2013). In 
addition, signalling theory suggests that corporate managers may signal their quality and 
ability in identifying, measuring and managing risk through reporting more information 
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voluntarily. Thus they can distinguish themselves from other managers who may be 
perceived to manage risk less effectively (Elshandidy et al, 2013). 
Company with high risk levels will try to increase risk disclosure to reduce uncertainties 
among investors implying a better evaluation of risk by market (Hassan, 2009). Disclosing 
risk-related information in unfavourable situation may also ensure investors about firm’s 
future prospects (Iatridis, 2008). Finally, managers have incentives to communicate risk-
related information and how these risks are managed to signal to a wider range of 
stakeholders their managerial skills and promote their images in labour market which may 
translate accordingly in higher compensations (Abraham and Cox, 2007).   
 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between risk factor and voluntary risk reporting is 
also inconclusive.  While Deumes (2008), Miihkinen (2012), Ntim et al. (2013) and 
Elshandidy et al (2013) find a positive association between risk levels and risk reporting, 
Lajili and Zegal (2005), Dobler, Lajili, and Zéghal (2011) and Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
did not find any significant association between the two variables.  
 
Given these mixed evidences, the following non-directional hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H04: there is an association between risk factor and voluntary risk reporting. 
 
3.5. Potential moderators of the risk reporting-firm characteristics associations1 
  
Legal system: Ahmed and Courtis (1999, p. 36) use Meta andlysis to  empirically examine 
the determinants of voluntary disclosure. They argue that ‘these inconclusive results could 
be due to differences in socio economic and political environments between countries’. 
                                                 
1In risk disclosure literature, three main proxies are used to measure the extent of voluntary risk disclosure 
including sentences and words count (Amran, Bin, Hassan, 2009), disclosure index (Lajili and Zegal, 2005; 
Mohobbot, 2005; Linsleya and Shrives, 2006;) and a dummy variable proxy for study examining specifically 
internal control risk disclosure (Doyle, Ge and McVay, 2007). In addition, some studies combine word counts 
and disclosure index approach. With respect to disclosure type, some studies focus on specific risk disclosure 
(e.g.  internal control), while others consider several types of risk reporting in their analysis (internal control 
risk, risk management, market risk).  
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Hence, we consider civil law countries versus common law countries. Common law and 
civil law countries have different properties of accounting information and accounting 
system attributes including professionalism and transparency for common law versus 
statutory control and secrecy for civil law countries which will impact risk-related 
disclosure and its determinants for these two accounting groups (Stulz and Williamson, 
2003). Hooi (2007) posits and finds that the level of secrecy negatively affects risk-related 
disclosure in banking industry. Since secrecy represents a prevailing characteristic in civil 
law countries, it is expected that risk disclosure will be lower in these countries.  Dobler, 
Lajili, and Zéghal (2011) suggest also that legal system may also affect disclosure quality 
and its determinants in common and civil law systems. As an illustrative example, they 
suggest that risk disclosure will be lower in Germany as compared to the USA.  Therefore, it 
is expected that legal system moderates the relationship risk reporting and corporate 
characteristics. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: Legal system moderates the relationship between risk reporting and corporate 
characteristics.  
 
Uncertainty avoidance: Wong (2012) suggests that uncertainty avoidance is the most 
influential cultural dimensions that may affect risk disclosure. Hope (2003, p. 221) defines 
uncertainty avoidance as “the degree to which people feel uncomfortable with ambiguity and 
an uncertain future”. According to Wong (2012) companies with low level of uncertainty 
avoidance are more open to accept criticisms, challenges and competitions. Therefore, they 
will communicate more risk management information (Wong, 2012). By contrast, 
companies operating in high uncertainty avoidance environment may be more reluctant to 
communicate risk information in order to avoid conflicts and reduce uncertainty of 
competition (Gray,1988; Wong, 2012).  
Therefore, managers operating in settings with high uncertainty avoidance are expected to 
communicate less risk-related information when they have more political visibility, high 
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leverage ratio, high risk factor and high profitability to avoid possible conflicts, restrict the 
uncertainties of competition and preserve security (Gray, 1988). Accordingly, it is expected 
that uncertainty avoidance affects the relation between risk reporting and corporate 
characteristics. Thus, we hypothesise that: 
H2: Uncertainty avoidance moderates the relationship between risk reporting and corporate 
characteristics. 
 
Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure: under mandatory regime, a firm has to align with 
mandatory requirements in term of risk reporting. Thus firms operating under the same 
mandatory risk reporting requirement will tend to the same disclosure policy. This implies 
that there will be a low level of variation in mandatory disclosure among firms. Therefore, 
corporate characteristics will not exert a significant effect on risk reporting under mandatory 
regime. Under voluntary regime, a company will have more incentives to communicate 
information concerning risk disclosure especially if it has high political visibility, high 
financial and systematic risk. Therefore, it is expected that the regime of disclosure will 
moderate the association between corporate characteristics and risk reporting. Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999) finds that the disclosure regime (mandatory versus voluntary) moderates the 
association between disclosure and corporate characteristics. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is formulated: 
H3: Disclosure regime (mandatory versus voluntary) moderates the relationship between 
risk reporting and corporate characteristics. 
 
Industry: firms operating in the same sector tend to adopt the same reporting strategy to 
avoid negative appreciation by the market (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). This implies that 
the focus on the same industry will reduce the variation of disclosure across companies 
leading to less significant association between corporate characteristics and risk reporting. 
In addition, financial industry is generally considered as highly regulated sector implying 
lower variation of risk disclosure across firms and thus less significant association is 
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expected between corporate characteristics and risk reporting. Finally, examining risk 
disclosure for both financial and non-financial may introduce a bias in the empirical analysis 
since financial companies are risk management entities and they are expected to make 
significantly different types of risk disclosure and  need, therefore, to be examined 
separately (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Studies dealing with the determinants of risk 
disclosure can be classified into three industry types: (i) financial, (ii) mixed financial and 
non-financial and (iii) excluding financial companies. We expect that the type of industry 
considered in the sample moderates the association between risk reporting and corporate 
characteristics. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4: Industry types moderate the relationship between risk reporting and corporate 
characteristics. 
  
Measurement of corporate characteristics: a meta-analytic accounting literature posits 
that the measurement of explanatory variables may also affect the examined relationship 
(Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Khlif and Souissi, 2010). Accordingly, the proxies used to 
measure corporate characteristics may also moderate the relationship between risk-related 
disclosure and corporate characteristics. For instance, corporate size is commonly measured 
by total assets, total sales, turnover and market capitalization. In this sense, market 
capitalization is more linked to investors’ reactions with respect to risk reporting compared 
to total assets. By contrast, total assets, total sales and turnover measure the strength of 
firm’s competitive position in its environment and barriers to entry for new firms (Mokhtar 
and Mellett, 2013). Accordingly, firm characterised by high barriers to entry may disclose 
more risk-related information since it dominates its competitors who cannot earn strong 
benefits from this kind of information (Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013). 
Return on equity (ROE) and leverage to equities (D/S) are more linked to shareholders’ 
power compared to return on assets (ROA) or leverage to total assets (D/A). Finally, beta as 
a measure of risk is more linked to investors’ reactions since it takes into accounts market 
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and firm’s return variability, while other proxies such as the probability of bankruptcy (Z-
score) are linked to corporate financial conditions.  Accordingly, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: The proxies used to measure corporate characteristics moderate the relationship risk 
reporting and corporate characteristics. 
 
3. Studies included in the meta-analysis  
 
In order to obtain a comprehensive list of relevant studies, we conduct a series of computer 
searches on AAA journals, Science Direct, EJSEbsco, Blackwell, Springer, Emerald, 
Inderscience, ABI Inform, and SSRN. We use several keywords to search for relevant 
articles including “voluntary risk disclosure and corporate characteristics”, “risk reporting 
and corporate characteristics”, “the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure”, “internal 
control risk reporting and corporate characteristics”, “drivers of risk disclosure” and 
“economics incentives for risk reporting”. The term “risk” is also replaced by “management 
market risk” to identify the maximum number of studies. We also consult specialized 
journals of accounting and finance which devote a great interest to voluntary disclosure and 
firm characteristics attributes especially The Journal of Risk Finance, International Review 
of Financial Analysis. References in collected studies are also consulted to identify other 
empirical papers. In order to avoid significant omissions and the arbitrary selection of 
papers, we base our search on the recent literature review undertaken by Oliveira et al. 
(2013) who report almost all studies dealing with the determinants risk disclosure. Our 
search was guided by tables reporting risk-related studies and the explanatory variables 
reported for each study2.   
Initially, we search for several corporate characteristics including corporate size, leverage 
ratio, profitability, risk factor, cross-listing, board independence and ownership 
concentration. However, three corporate characteristics were discarded including cross-
                                                 
2 For more details see Oliveira et al. (2013), tables 1, 2 & 3, pages 36-44, 
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listing, board independence and ownership concentration variables given the limited number 
of studies allowing us to obtain robust meta-analytic findings3. 
 Our searches yielded a total of 42 articles between 2004 and 2014. Among the 42 
papers, 25 articles are published in top ranked journals (AAA, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, 
Springer, Francis & Taylor), 13 in decent journals (Emerald, Inderscience and Macmillan) 
and 4 unpublished articles. Therefore, 60 % (25/42) of the studies included in our sample 
appears in ranked journals which increases accordingly the reliability of statistical 
inferences in our meta-analysis.  Table 1 illustrates the sample selection process. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                       ------------------------------------ 
 Table 2 summarizes the results of 42 empirical papers by year of publication, 
country focus, uncertainty avoidance score, number of observations sampled, reporting 
years, and effect size measure (r) for each corporate characteristics: corporate size, leverage 
profitability and risk factor. Three main methodologies are used to proxy for risk disclosure: 
sentences and words count, dummy variable and disclosure index.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                                       ------------------------------------ 
    Table 3 illustrates different proxies used for measuring independent variables. 
Corporate size is commonly measured using market capitalization, total assets, total sales 
and turnover. Leverage ratio and profitability ratio are commonly proxied by debt to total 
assets (D/A) or debt to total equities (D/S) and return on equity (ROE) and return on total 
assets (ROA) respectively. Finally, risk factor is commonly measured by beta and other risk 
indicators including the probability of bankruptcy and a loss dummy variable. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                                 
3 For these three variables we obtain less than 13 observations.  
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                                                      ----------------------------------- 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Effect size 
As explained earlier, we use meta-analysis to analyse relevant studies that examined the 
association between corporate characteristics and risk reporting and evaluate whether the 
level of association is consistent across the studies and if not, to further explore possible 
reasons for such conflicting results. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique for summarizing 
and reviewing previous quantitative empirical literature. By using meta-analysis, a wide 
range of research topics can be investigated, provided a large body of empirical research 
exists.  It is generally used to overcome the limitations of narrative reviews and increase the 
limited statistical power of studies with small sample sizes. Furthermore, narrative reviews 
lack acceptable rules of inference to go from the findings of studies to overall 
generalizations about the research literature and they are not well-suited to testing for 
moderating effects. In this regard, a meta-analysis may be a statistical tool which can enable 
researchers to summarise, in a statistically systematic manner, a large set of empirical 
results, reconcile conflicting findings and make sense of the rapidly expanding empirical 
literature (Glass, 1976; Hunter and Schmidt, 1990, Rosenthal, 1991).  
 
The meta-analysis technique requires the computation of the effect size to measure the 
magnitude of the association between the dependent variable (risk disclosure) and the 
explanatory variables. The effect size provides information about how much change is 
evident across all the studies and the magnitude of the association between the dependent 
variable (risk reporting) and the independent variables, including corporate size, leverage 
ratio, profitability ratio and risk factor. 
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In computing the effect size from the reported statistics, different procedures are used. When 
a study reports Person’s r coefficient, such a statistic is used to calculate the effect size 
between the disclosure score and the explanatory variable. Whenever other statistics are 
reported, such as Student t and Z value, the following formulas are used to compute the 
effect size respectively
)( 2
2
dft
t

 where df  is the degree of freedom and   
N
Z
 .
      
 
A meta-analytic database should be analyzed using the following three steps suggested by 
Hunter and Schmidt (2000):
 
(i)  First, the mean correlation ( r ) is calculated as: 
(1)       
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Where Ni: Sample size for study i,                       
 ir  : Pearson correlation coefficient for study i. 
(ii) Second, the observed variance ( 2rS ) and the sampling error variance (
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where K  is the number of individual studies included in the meta-analysis. 
(iii) Third, the variance used to estimate a confidence interval is )( 2 KS r .  
 
18 
 
The estimates of population mean ( r ) and the standard deviation KSr
2 are normally used 
to construct a 95 per cent confidence interval and assess the validity of the association of 
interests as per equation (4): 
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A 95 percent confidence interval that does not include zero is an indicator that there is a true 
association between the variables of interest (Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). 
Similarly, the following Z-statistic (
KS
r
Z
r
2
 ) is computed to assess the significance of 
the examined relationship. If the computed Z-statistic is significant at 5 % this represents 
also an indicator of the true relationship between the variables of interest.   
 
In order to test for moderating variables and determine whether the observed variance is 
trivial or higher than expected, a chi-square statistic test is suggested to assess whether the 
observed variance is due to moderating effects or to some statistical errors.  
                                                          
22
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
   (5) 
If the computed chi-square statistic is trivial compared to the tabulated one, the association 
is considered unmoderated and homogeneous, and the variation across studies is due only to 
some statistical (random) errors. Nevertheless, if the computed chi-square statistic is 
significant, further analyses are conducted to test for moderators and reduce heterogeneity 
across studies by sub-grouping the sample according to data characteristics (moderators) and 
study features.  
4.2. Moderating factors 
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As mentioned in sub-section (3.5) five moderating factors are examined in the analysis 
including legal system, the level of uncertainty avoidance, disclosure regimes, industry 
types and proxies used to measure explanatory variables.  
With respect to legal system, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Malawi,  South Africa, USA, 
UK, Nigeria are classified4 as common law countries, while Belgium, Egypt, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, Netherlands, South Korea, Tunisia, Switzerland, 
UAE are classified in civil law countries. With regard to uncertainty avoidance, the score for 
each country is obtained from the following website (http://geert-
hofstede.com/countries.html). High (low) uncertainty avoidance countries are those which 
have an uncertainty avoidance score superior (inferior) to the median of our sample.  
Concerning disclosure regime, studies are classified into two groups: voluntary disclosure 
and mandatory regime. Regarding the type of industry, we distinguish between samples 
dealing only with financial companies (Fin), samples including both financial and non-
financial companies (mixed) and samples excluding financial companies (Ex-Fin). 
With respect to the measurement of explanatory variables, corporate size is commonly 
measured using market capitalization, total assets, total sales and turnover. Leverage ratio 
and profitability ratio are commonly proxied by debt to total assets (D/A) or debt to total 
equities (D/S) and return on equity (ROE) and return on total assets (ROA) respectively. 
Finally, risk factor is commonly measured by beta, standard deviation of operating return 
and other risk indicators including the probability of bankruptcy and a loss dummy variable. 
5. Empirical results and discussions 
The results of this study are summarised in tables 4 and 5. In each table, we first present the 
overall results of the overall meta-analysis, and if the homogeneity test is rejected, we 
                                                 
4 This classification is based on Stulz and Williamson (2003) table 1 pages 323 - 324.   Countries like Iran, 
Tunisia,  Malawi and UAE are not listed in this table. For Tunisia, Kuwait and UAE, additional investigations 
show that they are classified as civil law countries, while Malawi is classified as common law setting. For Iran, 
no relevant information is found and thus it is dropped from the analysis for this moderator.  
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conduct further analyses according to legal system, the level of uncertainty avoidance, 
disclosure regime, industry types and proxies used to measure explanatory variables. 
 5.1. Corporate size 
The relationship between corporate size and risk reporting in 43 studies is shown in table 
(4.A). Overall, consistent with agency theory, the meta-analysis shows that corporate size 
has a significant positive effect on risk disclosure, with a mean correlation ( r ) of 0.075 (Z = 
2.615) and a 95 per cent confidence interval ranging from 0.018 to 0.132. Therefore, we 
accept the hypothesis H01 and conclude that there is a significant positive association 
between corporate size and risk-related disclosure. These results provide support for agency, 
political costs and legitimacy theories. 
The calculated observed variance ( 2rS ) shows a high degree of variation (heterogeneity) 
across the 435 studies since the sampling error variance explains only 4.480 % of the 
observed variance and the computed Chi-square accounts for 959.758 and it is highly 
significant compared to the tabulated Chi-square at 5 % significance level which amounts 
58.1246.  Since heterogeneity is significantly high and explanatory power of the observed 
variance is low, a sub-group meta-analysis is conducted to reduce heterogeneity by studying 
five moderator variables as explained earlier.  
When sub-group meta-analysis is conducted with respect to legal system,  results show that 
corporate size has a significant positive effect on risk reporting only for civil law countries 
with a mean correlation of 0.125 (Z = 3.113) and a confidence interval between 0.046 and 
0.203. By contrast, the relationship is non-significant for common law countries with a near-
zero mean correlation of 0.027 (Z = 0.796) and high degree of heterogeneity since the 
sampling error variance explains only 4.790 % of the observed variance and a high 
computed Chi-square of 417.284. Therefore, H1 is supported and legal system moderates the 
                                                 
5 Since Dobler et al. (2011) encompasses four independent samples. 
6 The tabulated Chi-square statistic with a degree of freedom of 42 (43-1).  
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relationship between corporate size and risk reporting. This result can be explained by the 
developed risk reporting practices in common law countries implying lower variation of risk 
reporting across firms in these settings. In addition, the degree of regulation of risk reporting 
in common law countries (e.g. the reporting of internal control risk mandated by the SOX 
act in 2002) may mitigate the association between corporate size and risk reporting in 
common law countries since companies may adopt the same disclosure policy which 
reduces the effect of corporate size on risk reporting.  
Similarly, uncertainty avoidance moderates also the relationship between corporate size and  
risk reporting. For instance, the association is only significant for high uncertainty 
avoidance countries with a mean correlation of 0.146 (Z = 3.225), while it is non-significant 
for low uncertainty avoidance countries with a mean correlation of 0.005 (Z = 0.214). This 
implies that corporate size leads to more risk-related disclosure in high uncertainty 
avoidance settings. Thus H2 is supported. This result is not in line with our expectation. 
However, in low uncertainty avoidance settings, risk reporting practices are more 
developed, especially in UK and USA, and this will mitigate the association between 
corporate size and risk reporting in these settings.  
In addition, disclosure regime moderates also the association between corporate size and 
risk disclosure. For instance, corporate size has a significant positive effect voluntary risk 
reporting (0.120; Z = 3.254), while it is not significantly related for mandatory risk 
disclosure (-0.016; Z = -0.465). Therefore, H3 is confirmed and disclosure regime moderates 
the association between corporate size and risk reporting. Under voluntary regime, managers 
will have more incentives to communicate risk information to distinguish their firm from 
others. By contrast, mandatory regime will reduce the economic incentives to communicate 
more risk information since firms have to align with legal requirement and mandatory 
disclosure practices adopted by other companies.   
22 
 
When we examine the moderating effect of industry and sample composition, our findings 
show that the association is significant for financial companies (0.476; Z = 4.575) and 
samples excluding non-financial firms (0.123; Z = 3.396), while it is non-significant for 
samples combining financial and non-financial companies (-0.037; Z = -1.429). Therefore, 
H4 is confirmed and industry type moderates the association between corporate size and risk 
reporting. 
Finally, we examine the moderating effect of corporate size measurement7; results show that 
the association is only significant when size is proxied by total assets and total sales with 
two mean correlations of 0.111 (Z = 2.805) and 0.242 (Z = 2.328) respectively. By contrast, 
the relationship is non-significant for market capitalisation8. This result can be explained by 
the fact that companies with high market capitalisation try to avoid risk disclosure to reduce 
its adverse effect on firm’s value given that investors may interpret this information in 
different ways. When corporate size is proxied by turnover, the association is also non- 
significant. However, this result has to be interpreted with caution given the limited number 
of studies used. Based on these meta-analytic findings, we confirm that the association 
between corporate size and risk disclosure is moderated by explanatory variable proxies and 
thus H5 is supported. This result confirms that the strength of firm’s competitive position in 
its environment, as proxied by total assets and total sales, increases management incentives 
to communicate risk information (Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013). 
5.2. Leverage   
                                                 
7 We note here that the size measures are highly correlated when firms operate in sector with low level of 
intangibles assets. However, when firms operate in industries where intangible assets account for a large 
proportion of the assets (e.g. high tech sector), there will be a gap between market capitalisation and total 
assets. Empirical studies do not control for this factor in their analysis which limits our ability study its 
moderating effect.  
8 It should be noted here that Souissi and Khlif (2012) have documented in their meta-analysis dealing with the 
effect of voluntary disclosure on cost of equity capital a non-significant association between cost of equity 
capital and voluntary disclosure in high disclosure environment including Australia, UK and USA. Given the 
inverse relationship between cost of equity capital and market capitalisation, and the high weight of  Australia, 
UK and USA for the market capitalisation sub-sample, the same non-significant is expected for market 
capitalisation and voluntary risk reporting.   
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Table (4.B) shows the results of the meta-analysis of the association between leverage ratio 
and risk-related disclosure. Overall, the meta-analysis indicates that leverage ratio is 
significantly correlated with risk reporting with a mean correlation of 0.067 (Z = 2.034) and 
a confidence interval between 0.002 and 0.132. Therefore, H02 is accepted.  This finding 
provides support for agency and signaling theories. Since the homogeneity test is rejected, 
as indicated by the high value Chi-square statistic (137.584), we undertake further analysis 
in order to search for moderator variables.  
When meta-analytic comparison is conducted according to legal system, findings show that 
the relationship is non-significant for countries belonging to common law system with a 
mean correlation of 0.053 (Z = 1.299), while it is significant in civil law countries with a 
mean correlation of 0.109 (Z = 1.993). Thus, legal system moderates the relation between 
risk reporting and leverage ratio and H1 is supported. One plausible explanation for the 
result is that in civil countries companies operate under bank-oriented system, while 
companies in common law countries operate under market-oriented system  (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, 2001). By contrast, the association between leverage ratio and risk 
reporting is not moderated by the level of uncertainty avoidance since the association 
remains insignificant for the high and low uncertainty avoidance groups. Therefore, H2 is 
not supported.  
Sub-group meta-analysis conducted with respect disclosure regime shows that the 
relationship between leverage ratio and risk disclosure is significant only for voluntary 
disclosure group with a mean correlation amounting for 0.073 (Z = 2.150), while it is not 
significant for mandatory disclosure group. Therefore, disclosure regime moderates the 
association between risk disclosure and leverage and thus H3 is supported. Industry type 
moderates also the association since the relationship is positive and significant for studies 
excluding financial companies (0.082; Z = 2.278), while it is non-significant for samples 
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combining both financial and non-financial firms (-0.041; Z = -0.534). Thus, H4 is also 
supported.   
Finally, we examine the moderating effect of leverage ratio proxy on the association 
between leverage ratio and risk reporting and we document that the relationship is only 
significant when the former is measured by debt to total equities (D/S) with a mean 
correlation of 0.172 (Z = 3.556), while it is non-significant for D/A with a mean correlation 
of 0.014 (Z = 0.551). Thus H5 is supported. This result can be explained by the fact that 
(D/S) is more linked to shareholders’ power and thus high (D/S) implies more risk related 
disclosure.  
                                                 ------------------------------------ 
                                                   Insert Table 4 about here 
                                                   ------------------------------------ 
5.3. Profitability  
In Table (5.C), we report the results of the association between profitability ratio and risk 
disclosure. The relationship between both variables has a mean correlation of 0.044 (Z = 
2.006), with a 95 per cent confidence interval between 0.001 and 0.088. Therefore, H03 is  
supported and the association between risk disclosure and profitability is significant. This 
result is in line with the predictions of signaling and agency theories.  Since only 34 per cent 
of the observed variance can be explained by sampling error, further tests for moderator 
variables are undertaken.  
When sub-group meta-analysis is undertaken with respect to legal system, findings show 
that this factor does not moderate the relationship between risk disclosure and profitability. 
By contrast, when we study the moderating effect of uncertainty avoidance, the association 
becomes significant only for countries characterized by high uncertainty avoidance with a 
mean correlation of 0.104 (Z = 1.988)9. For countries characterized by low uncertainty 
                                                 
9Countries classified in high uncertainty avoidance group are: Australia, Belgium, Finland, Japan, Kuwait,  
Portugal, and Switzerland. 
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avoidance, the relationship is non-significant with a mean correlation of 0.009 (Z = 0.585)10.  
Thus, H1 is rejected, while H2 is supported and uncertainty avoidance level moderates the 
association between profitability and risk reporting.  
When sub-group meta-analysis is undertaken with respect to disclosure regime, results show 
that this moderator does not affect the association between profitability and risk reporting. 
By contrast, industry type moderates the above association since the mean correlation for 
studies excluding financial companies accounts for 0.056 (Z = 2.075), while it is non-
significant for studies including financial and non-financial companies (-0.006; Z = -0.151). 
Finally, studies examining only financial companies show a negative and significant 
relationship between profitability and risk reporting (-0.040; Z = -10.087)11.  Therefore, H3 
is rejected, while H4 is supported.  
Finally, we study the moderating effect of profitability measures (ROE versus ROA). 
Results show that association is a near-zero relationship for ROE with a mean correlation of 
0.004 (Z = 0.452), while it is non-significant at 5 % significance level when profitability is 
proxied by ROA with a mean correlation of 0.053 (Z = 1.742) with a confidence interval 
including negative value.  Thus, the proxy used to measure profitability does not moderate 
the association and  H5 is rejected.   
5.4. Risk factor 
The results of the meta-analysis of the effect of risk factor on risk disclosure are presented in 
table (5.D). The analysis of 20 studies shows a significant mean correlation of 0.054 (Z = 
3.825).  Therefore, H04 is supported.  The computed Chi-square accounts for (70.147) and it 
is significant at 1 per cent significance level12 and the sampling error variance only explains 
28.500 % of the observed variance. Since these two statistics indicate  a high degree of 
                                                 
10 Countries classified in high uncertainty avoidance group are:  Canada, Netherlands, South Africa, Malawi,  
UK and USA. 
11 This result should be interpreted with caution given the limited number of studies examined. 
12 The tabulated Chi-square statistic with a degree of freedom of  19 (20-1) accounts for 36.191. 
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variation (heterogeneity) across the 20 studies, additional tests for moderators are 
conducted.   
When studies are sub-grouped according to legal system, the relationship between risk 
factor and risk reporting is significant for both civil law settings (0.043; Z = 2.064 and 
common law countries (0.053; Z = 3.009). Similarly, the association is also significant for 
high and low uncertainty avoidance groups with two mean correlations accounting for 0.065 
(Z = 2.179) and 0.045 (Z = 3.065) respectively. Thus H1 and H2 are  not supported.  
Sub-group meta-analysis is also undertaken with respect to disclosure regime. Results show 
that the association is significant for mandatory and voluntary groups with mean 
correlations accounting for (0.039: Z = 2.302; 0.059: Z = 3.155) respectively.  By contrast, 
industry type moderates the association since the relationship between risk factor and risk 
reporting is significant only for studies that exclude financial companies from their analysis 
(0.055; Z= 3.237), while it is non-significant for studies combining financial and non-
financial firms (0.048; Z = 1.643) and financial companies (0.101; Z=1.741). Therefore,  H3 
is rejected, while  H4 is supported.  
Finally, the proxies used to measure risk factor (beta, loss and standard deviation of returns) 
do not moderate the examined relationship since the mean correlations amount to (0.091 (Z 
= 2.989); 0.045 (Z = 2.468); 0.229 (6.339)). Therefore, H5 is not supported. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
                                                    ------------------------------------ 
5.5. Additional analysis 
Publication quality: Meta-analysis may be affected by the publication bias (Moller and 
Jennions 2001). Generally, quality journals tend to accept studies with significant results. As  
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shown in table (1), 25 papers are published in ranked journals1314, while 13 appear in decent 
journals and 4 are unpublished studies. Therefore, we try to examine whether publication 
quality affects the examined relationships. The group of quality journals incorporates the 25 
papers published in good journals, while the second group includes the 17 remaining papers. 
The publication quality does not moderate the relationship for leverage ratio and corporate 
profitability since the association is not significant for low and high quality  publications 
with two mean correlations for  leverage ratio that account for 0.039 (Z = 1.207) and 0.085 
(Z = 1.788) respectively, and  0.013 (Z = 0.607) and 0.051 (Z = 1.600) respectively for 
profitability ratio. With respect to risk factor, the association is significant for the two 
groups (0.063; Z = 3.499 and 0.041; Z = 3.463) respectively for low and high quality 
journals. Finally, journal quality moderates the association between corporate size and risk 
reporting since the mean correlation for low quality journals accounts for 0.320 (Z = 6.951), 
while it is of 0.042 (Z = 1.386) for high quality journals.  
File-drawer problem: The above analysis captured the moderating effect for publication 
status for the sample of the studies included in our meta-analysis. However, it does not 
account for unpublished studies. Rosenthal (1979) refers to this problem as the 'file drawer 
problem'. We apply Orwin's (1983) method to determine the extent of the file drawer 
problem and whether the conclusions drawn from our meta-analysis are likely to be 
influenced by such publication bias. This method requires the estimation of the fail-safe N 
being the number of unreported studies with insignificant results required to reduce the 
                                                 
13 For the purpose of ranking, we used the Association of Business Schools (ABS) list of journals (2010) in 
order to avoid confusion due to the availability of several university-specific journal rankings.  This ranking 
considers quality journals and classifies them from grade 4 to grade 1.  In our meta-analysis, quality journal are 
those reported in this raking. All the remaining are considered as decent or low quality journals.   
14
According to ABS, ranked journals are : Accounting and Finance, Auditing: Journal of Practice and Theory, British 
Accounting Review, Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences,  Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of 
Accounting Research, International Review of Financial Analysis, The International Journal of Accounting, Journal of 
International Accounting Research, Managerial Auditing Journal, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance and The 
Journal of Risk Finance. 
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mean effect size to a specified criterion. The fail-safe N is calculated using equation (6).       
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0
0
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ES
KK k .  (6) 
0K  Fail-safe N or the number of non significant, unpublished studies  
K  number of studies included in the meta-analysis 
kES   effect size of studies included in the analysis 
0ES  the criterion effect size of 0.05 significance level which will reduce the effect size to a specified 
criterion. 
 
The Fail-safe N is computed when significant relationships are reported. The fail-safe N 
ranges from 5 for profitability to 65 for corporate size for overall samples indicating that our 
results do not suffer from a file drawer problem. Similarly, as show in tables 4 and 5, the 
fail-safe N computed for each sub-group that reports significant relationship indicates that 
the relationship remains stable. For instance, when the association is significant with a 
limited number of studies (e.g. risk factor as proxied by standard deviation of operating 
returns), the computed fail-safe N indicates also the stability of the relationship reported.15   
6. Conclusion 
Risk reporting practices have been gaining major interest in accounting literature. More 
specifically, a large number of disclosure studies have been devoted to studying the effect of 
corporate characteristics on risk disclosure over the last decade. Accordingly, we apply the 
meta-analysis technique in the present study in an attempt to summarize and reconcile 
conflicting findings in the empirical literature and identify possible factors affecting results. 
Our meta-analysis has investigated the link between risk reporting and four corporate 
characteristics including corporate size, leverage ratio, profitability and risk factor.  The 
study tests whether the examined relationships are moderated by  legal system, level of 
                                                 
15 The fail safe N accounts for 4 studies. 
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uncertainty avoidance, disclosure regime, industry types and the proxies used to measure 
explanatory variables.  
Findings show that corporate size, leverage ratio, profitability and risk factor are positively 
associated with risk reporting. Tests for moderators provide evidence that corporate size and 
leverage ratio are positively and significantly associated with risk reporting under voluntary 
disclosure regime. These results provide support for agency, signalling and political costs 
theories. In addition, corporate size and leverage ratio exert a significant positive effect on 
risk reporting in civil law countries, while corporate size and profitability are positively 
associated with risk reporting in high uncertainty avoidance settings. Finally, the association 
between the four corporate characteristics and risk reporting is non-significant when 
researchers use samples that include both financial and non-financial companies. This 
implies that the lack of homogeneity across sectors may introduce a bias into the statistical 
analysis. Therefore, our findings emphasise the need to explicitly consider the legal and 
institutional charateritics of one setting and industry type feature when analysing the 
relationship between corporate characteristics and risk reporting.  
By providing a quantitative generalization drawn from a sample of empirical studies dealing 
with the determinants of risk reporting, our study complements previous meta-analysis 
conducted in this regard (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Khlif and Souissi, 2010) by focusing on 
specific disclosure topic. In addition, since risk reporting has been the focus of several 
accounting regulators worldwide including The American Accounting Association (AAA), 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and professional accounting bodies (e.g. 
ICAEW), understanding why firms communicate risk information is useful for accounting 
standard-setters to reduce the information risk gap between firms, shareholders and 
stakeholders. Finally, the present study provides also a foundational knowledge resource 
with respect to the topic dealing with the determinants of risk disclosure that will inform 
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practice and future research initiatives. Accordingly, our meta-analysis provides guidance 
for future research in under-researched settings helping researchers to identify theoretical 
frameworks, previous empirical literature and methodologies used. 
There are limitations inherent in this study. The computation of effect size from several 
studies conducted in different contexts, over different periods and using a wide range of 
econometric methodologies including multiple regression analysis and non-parametric tests, 
could introduce a bias in the overall results and create ‘apples and oranges’ problems. 
However, our analysis is in line with previous meta-analyses conducted in accounting 
(Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009 and García-Meca and 
Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010), in Auditing (Trotman and Wood, 1991). In addition, Christie 
(1990) argues that the computation of effect size from the multiple regression technique 
does not violate the independence assumption required to conduct statistical analysis. Our 
meta-analysis does not account for the bad versus good information risk disclosure. 
However, primary data collected from studies do not allow us to control for the moderating 
effects of this important aspect in risk reporting. Moreover, studies have employed different 
composition of risk disclosure indices in terms of number of items, types of risk included 
and the quantification of disclosure level (e.g. number of sentences, dummy variables). 
Finally, the inclusion of unpublished studies or studies published in low quality journals 
may also introduce a bias in the statistical analysis. However, we control for the effect of 
publication bias in meta-analytic results.  
Several avenues for future research exist with respect to the determinants of risk disclosure. 
First, since there is a limited number of studies dealing with the effect of governance 
attributes (e.g. ownership concentration, board characteristics), future meta-analysis may 
examine this topic when a sufficient number of studies are available. In addition, 
distinguishing between good versus bad news risk disclosures may increase our 
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understanding of the determinants and the value relevance of risk disclosure. Furthermore, 
cross-country studies can be undertaken to examine how cultural dimensions may affect risk 
disclosure within specific industry sectors. It is, also, interesting that future research focuses 
on internal control weaknesses disclosure especially in countries where this topic remains 
under-researched (civil law European countries). Finally, since the association between 
corporate size and market capitalisation is mixed, future research may examine more 
comprehensively the economic consequences of risk information especially with respect to 
cost of  equity capital and test its value relevance.. 
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Table 1. Sample selection 
 
 Number of studies Percentage 
Initial sample 52 100 % 
Criteria leading to exclusion of studies   
Studies providing only descriptive statistics (a) 10 19.607 
Final sample 42 83.393 
Publication quality Number of studies Percentage 
Ranked journals 25 59.523 
Decent referred  Journals 13 30.952 
Unpublished studies 4         9.525 
Total 42 100 % 
 
                             Notes: (a) Carlon, Loftus, and Miller.  (2003); Marshall and Weetman (2002) 
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Table 2. Studies included in the meta-analysis 
Studies Country 
No of 
firms 
Reporting years 
Sector Mandatory/ 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
proxy 
Effect size (Person's coefficient) 
 Sources of information 
 Size Profitability leverage Risk 
Beretta & Bozalan (2004) Italy 85 2001 EXF Voluntary NS 0.650    Table.  6, p. 18 
Ge and Mac Vay (2005) USA 261 2002-2004 Mixed Mandatory NS -0.030  -0.040  Table. 5, p. 151 
Lajili & Zegal (2005) Canada 228 1999 Mixed Voluntary DI (72) -0.086 -0.046 0.029 0.013 Table 2, P. 131 
Mohobbot (2005) Japan 90 2003 Mixed Voluntary DI (58) 0.261 0.102 0.065   Tables. 4, 4, 6, p. 124 & 125 
Linsleya & Shrives (2006) UK 79 2000 EXF Voluntary DI (37) 0.476   0.139 0.053 Table. 4,  p. 397 
Linsleya & Shrives (2006) UK & 
Canada 
18 2001 Financial Mandatory NS 0.615 0.121  -0.194 Table. 7, p. 279 
Abrahama  and Cox (2007) UK    71 2002 EXF Voluntary   0.232   0.176 0.365 Table. 4, p. 241 
Doyle et al. (2007) USA 3918 2003-2005 Mixed Mandatory DV -0.035     0.032 Table. 7 MW_Company _level, p. 215 
Doyle et al. (2007) USA 3588 2002-2005 Mixed Mandatory DV -0.053   0.107 Table. 3, p. 1156 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) USA 4810 2003-2004 EXF Voluntary DV -0.024     0.039 Table. 4 (model. 2), p. 182 
Konish & Ali (2007) Japan 100 2003 EXF Voluntary DI (18) 0.314    Table. 5, p. 274 
Lopes and Rodriguez (2007) Portugal   47 2001 Mixed  Mandatory DI (54) 0.249  0.148  Table. 9, p. 45 
Deumes (2008) Netherlands 31 1990 Mixed Voluntary Factor loading 0.540     0.570 Table. 3 (A), p. 141 
Deumes & Knechel (2008) Netherlands 490 1997-1999 EXF Voluntary DI (6) 0.530 -0.030 0.200   Table. 3, p. 53 
Itardis (2008) UK 215 2004 EXF Voluntary DV 0.079 0.124 0.138  Table, 1 (panel F), p. 229 
Amran et al. (2009) Malyasia 100 2006 Mixed Voluntary NS 0.617 0.086   Table. 5, p. 50 
Hassan (2009) UAE 41 2006 Mixed Voluntary DI (45) 0.193   0.448   Table. 3, p.677 
Hill & Short (2009) UK 420 1991-1999 Mixed Voluntary DV -0.109   -0.148   Tale. 4 B, 774 
Rajab & Handley-Schachler 
(2009) 
UK 156 1998-2001 & 
2004 
EXF Voluntary NS 0.084   0.066   Table. 7, p. 12 
Vandemaele et al. (2009) Belguim 46 2006 EXF Voluntary NS 0.391 0.385   0.240 Table. 6, p. 14 
Taylor et al. (2010) Australia 424 2002-2006 EXF Voluntary DI (14) 0.677 0.288 0.415   Table. 3, p. 430 
Dobler et al. 2011 US 37 2005 EXF Mandatory DI (13) 0.349   0.448 0.031 Table. 5, (B, C, D, E) p. 16 & 17 
Dobler et al. 2011 Canada 36 2005 EXF Mandatory DI (13) 0.455   0.052 0.355 Table. 5, (B, C, D, E) p. 16 & 17 
Dobler et al. 2011 UK 40 2005 EXF Mandatory DI (13) 0.429   0.061 -0.049 Table. 5, (B, C, D, E) p. 16 & 17 
Dobler et al. 2011 Germany 40 2005 EXF Mandatory DI (13) 0.432   -0.335 -0.038 Table. 5, (B, C, D, E) p. 16 & 17 
Elshandidy (2011) SC 795 2007-2009 EXF Voluntary NS 0.092 0.019   0.082 Table. 7.7., p. 170 
Hemrit & Ben Arab (2011) Tunisia 129 2000-2009 Financial Voluntary DV 0.220 0.055 0.229   table. 8, p. 102 
Oliveira et al.  (2011) Potugal 111 2006 Financial Voluntary DI (24) 0.510 -0.080     Table. 5, p.  282 
Oliveira et al.  (2011) Potugal 81 2005 EXF Voluntary NS 0.390   0.150   Table. 5, p. 833 
Elzahar & Hussainey, (2012) UK 72 2009 EXF Voluntary NS 0.373 0.060 -0.073   Table. 5, p.  142 
Miihkinen (2012) Finland 198 2005-2006 EXF Mandatory DI (41) 0.235 0.152 -0.168 0.185 Table. 4, p. 16 
Peters & Romi (2012) USA 1238 2002-2006 EXF Voluntary DV 0.260 -0.016 -0.006   Table. 7 
Rice & Weber (2012) USA 488 2004-2009 Mixed Mandatory DV -0,088     0.162 Table. 4, p. 829 
Savvides & Savvidou (2012)  SC   30 2008 Financial Voluntary NS 0.522    Table. 4, p. 394 
Choi et al. (2013) South Korea 5402 2005-2008 EXF Mandatory DV 0.040   0.035 Table. 4, p. 183 
Hunziker (2013) Swizerland    67 2011  EXF Mandatory NS 0,437 0.158 0.368 -0.03 Table. 6, p. 14 
Baraket & Husseiny (2013) SC 243 2008-2010 Financial Voluntary DI (40) 0.709     0.125 Table. 2, p. 35 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) UK 1216 2005-2009 EXF Voluntary NS 0,094 0.011     Table. 2, p. 45 
Notes: SC: refers to several countries; DV: dummy variable, NS: sentences and words count:, DI: disclosure index, (number of items).  EXF: refers to samples excluding financial companies from the analysis.  
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Studies Country 
No of 
firms 
Reporting years 
Sector Mandatory/ 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
proxy 
Effect size (Person's coefficient) 
 Sources of information 
 Size Profitability leverage Risk 
Mokhtar & Mellett (2013) Egypt    72 2007 EXF Voluntary DI (40) 0.219    Table. 4, p. 19 
Ntim et al. (2013) South Africa 500 2002-2011 EXF Voluntary NS 0.206 0.080 -0.039 0.210 Table 6. p. 43 
Abdul Rahman et al. (2013) SC   60 2008-2010 Financial Mandatory NS -0.041    Table. 5, p. 157 
Soodanian et al. (2013) Iran 174 2010 EXF Voluntary DV -0.028   0.389 Table. 5, p. 72 
Uba Adamu (2013) Nigeria   12 2010 EXF Voluntary DI (25)   -0.288  Table 4.7, p. 145 
Al-Shammari (2014) Kuwait 109 2012 EXF Voluntary NS 0.259 -0.053 0.062  Table. 6, p. 143 
Lipunga (2014) Malawi    7 2012 Financial Voluntary DI (34)  -0.331   Table. 5, p. 163 
Notes: SC: refers to several countries; DV: dummy variable, NS: sentences and words count:, DI: disclosure index, (number of items).  EXF: refers to samples excluding financial companies from the analysis.  
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Studies Size Leverage Profitability Risk Journal or source of publication 
Beretta & Bozalan (2004) Turnover    The International Journal of Accounting 
Ge and Mac Vay (2005) MC  ROA  Accounting Horizans 
Lajili and Zegal (2005) TA D/A ROA Beta Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences 
Mohobbot (2005) TA D/S ROA  Japanese Journal of Accounting 
Linsleya & Shrives (2006) MC D/S  Beta British Accounting Review 
Linsleya & Shrives (2006) MC  ROA Book to market value of equity Journal of Banking Regulation 
Abrahama  &Cox (2007) TS D/A  Return variance British Accounting Review 
Doyle et al. (2007) MC   Z-score Journal of Accounting and Economics 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) MC   Loss variable Journal of Accounting and Economics 
Lopes and Rodriguez (2007) TA D/S   The International Journal of Accounting 
Konish & Ali (2007) TA 
  
 
International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Performance Evaluation  
Deumes (2008) MC   Beta Journal of Business Communication 
Deumes & Knechel (2008) TA  ROE  Auditing: Journal of Practice and Theory 
Doyle et al. (2008) TA   Loss The Accounting Review 
Itardis (2008) 
TR D/S 
Operating 
profit margin 
 
International Review of Financial Analysis 
Hassan (2009) TA D/A   Managerial Auditing Journal 
Hill &  Short (2009) MC OTHER   Accounting and Finance 
Rajab & Handley-Schachler 
(2009) Turnover D/S 
  World Review of Entrepreneurship Management and 
Sustainable Development 
Vademaele, et al. (2009) 
TA 
 ROA 
 Beta 
Unpublished paper 
(https://uhdspace.uhasselt.be/dspace/handle/1942/9392) 
Taylor et al. (2010) TA D/S ROA  Accounting and Finance 
Amran et al. (2009) TR D/A   Managerial Auditing Journal 
Dobler et al. 2011 TA D/S  Beta Journal of International Accounting Research 
Dobler et al. 2011 TA D/S  Beta Journal of International Accounting Research 
Dobler et al. 2011 TA D/S  Beta Journal of International Accounting Research 
Dobler et al. 2011 TA D/S  Beta Journal of International Accounting Research 
Elshandidy (2011) TA  ROE Beta PhD thesis. Stirling University 
Hemrit & Ben Arab (2011) TA D/S ROA  The Journal of Operational Risk 
Oliveira et al.  (2011) TA  ROA  Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 
Oliveira et al.  (2011) FL D/A   Managerial Auditing Journal 
Elzahar & Hussainey, (2012) TA D/A ROE  The Journal of Risk Finance 
Miihkinen (2012) TA D/S ROA Beta The International Journal of Accounting 
Peters & Romi (2012) TA D/A ROA  SSRN 
Rice & Weber (2012) MC   Loss (DV) Journal of Accounting Research 
Savvides & Savvidou (2012)  MC    International Journal of Organizational Analysis 
Choi et al. (2013) TA   Loss (DV) Auditing: Journal of Practice and Theory 
Hunziker (2013) MC D/A 
 
ROA Beta Working paper 
Baraket & Husseiny (2013) TA  Z-score International Review of Financial Analysis 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) MC  ROE  International Review of Financial Analysis 
Notes: TA: total assets, MC: market capitalization, TR: total revenues; D/A: debt/ total assets; D/S: debt/ equity; ROA: net profit/total assets; ROE:  net profit/equity. 
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Table 3. Continued 
Studies Size Leverage Profitability Risk Journal or source of publication 
Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) TR    Managerial Auditing Journal 
Ntim et al. (2013) TA D/A ROA Standard deviation of operational 
profits 
International Review of Financial Analysis 
Abdul Rahman et al. (2013) TA    Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 
Soodanian et al. (2013)  D/A   Research Journal of Finance and Accounting 
Uba Adamu (2013) MC   Loss Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological 
Sciences 
Al-Shammari (2014) TA D/A ROE  Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business Research 
Lipunga (2014)   ROA  Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business Research 
Notes: TA: total assets, MC: market capitalization, TR: total revenues; D/A: debt/ total assets; D/S: debt/ equity; ROA: net profit/total assets; ROE:  net profit/equity. 
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Table  4. Corporate size, leverage ratio and risk reporting 
  
Sample 
(N) 
Number 
of studies 
(K) 
Mean 
correlation r  
 
Observed 
variance  
2
rS  
Estimated error 
variance 
2
eS  
Percentage explained 
2
eS /
2
rS  
Z-statitic 95 % confidence interval 
 2 1K  
File-
drawer 
Corporate size  (A)                   
Overall meta-analysis 26357 43 0.075*** 0.036 0.001 4.480 2.615 0.018; 0.132 959.758*** 65 
Moderating factors           
Civil law   7139 17 0.125*** 0.027 0.002 8.400 3.113 0.046; 0.203 202.377*** 31 
Common law 17897 20 0.027 0.023 0.001 4.790 0.796 -0.039; 0.094 417.284*** - 
High uncertainty avoidance   8372 17 0.146*** 0.034 0.002 5.670 3.225 0.058; 0.234 300.088*** 39 
          - Low uncertainty avoidance 16973 18 0.005 0.012 0.001 8.420 0.214 -0.046; 0.057 213.809*** - 
           Voluntary 18046 31 0.120*** 0.042 0.002 3.950 3.254 0.047; 0.192 785.702*** 97 
Mandatory   4881 12 -0.016 0.015 0.002 16.320 -0.465 -0.085; 0.052   73.522***  
           Excluding financial sector 16643 27 0.123*** 0.036 0.001 4.400 3.396 0.052; 0.195 614.177*** 95 
Financial sector    592   6 0.476*** 0.064 0.006 9.340 4.575 0.272; 0.679   64.259*** 11 
Mixed  9122 10 -0.037 0.007 0.001 15.570 -1.429 -0.089; 0.014   64.223*** - 
           TA 14064 24 0.111*** 0.037 0.001 4.420 2.805 0.033; 0.188 543.290*** 65 
MC 11513 12 -0.011 0.007 0.001 14.790 -0.461 -0.058; 0.036   81.131*** - 
TR     458   4 0.242*** 0.043 0.007 17.880 2.328 0.038; 0.446   22.367*** 6 
Turnover     241   2 0.283 0.073 0.007   9.590 1.483 -0.091; 0.658    20.845*** - 
Leverage (B)           
Overall meta-analysis 4920 25 0.067** 0.027 0.005 18.170 2.034 0.002; 0.132 137.584*** 9 
Moderating  factors           
Civil law 1251  9 0.109** 0.027 0.007 25.750 1.993 0.001; 0.217 32.945*** 4 
Common law 3669 16 0.053 0.027 0.004 16.030 1.299 -0.037; 0.134 99.830*** - 
High uncertainty avoidance 1675 11 0.061 0.027 0.004 14.850 1.231 -0.036; 0.115 46.389*** - 
        -   Low uncertainty avoidance 3116 13 0.064 0.028 0.004 14.850 1.390 _0.026; 0.155 87.557*** - 
           
Voluntary 4455 18 0.073** 0.025 0.004 16.650 2.150 0.006; 0.148 114.084*** 11 
Mandatory   465   7 -0.012 0.059 0.015 25.190 -0.135 --0.168; 0.193   27.788*** - 
Excluding financial sector 4055 20 0.082*** 0.026 0.005 18.620 2.278 0.011; 0.159 107.453*** 13 
Mixed   736   4 -0.041 0.024 0.005 22.900 -0.534 -0.191; 0.109   17.467*** - 
           D/S 2120 15 0.170*** 0.034 0.007 19.410 3.556 0.076; 0.264   77.288*** 17 
D/V 2380  9 0.014 0.006 0.004 60.380 0.551 -0.037; 0.066   14.904*** - 
         Notes: Dependent variable:  risk disclosure; TA: total assets, MC: market capitalization, TR: total revenues; D/A: debt/ total assets; D/S: debt/ equity. * p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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Table  5. Profitability, corporate risk and risk reporting 
 
  
Sample 
(N) 
Number 
of studies 
(K) 
Mean 
correlation r  
 
Observed 
variance  
2
rS  
Estimated error 
variance 
2
eS  
Percentage explained 
2
eS /
2
rS  
Z-statitic 95 % confidence interval 
 2 1K  
File-
drawer 
Profitability  (C)                   
Overall meta-analysis 5834 19 0.044** 0.009 0.003 34.510 2.006 0.001; 0.088 55.051*** 5 
Moderating factors           
Civil law 1240   8 0.036 0.011 0.006 56.210 0.956 -0.037; 0.110 14.232*** - 
Common law 4161   9 0.039 0.009 0.002 23.830 1.238 -0.022; 0.104 37.762*** - 
High uncertainty avoidance 1536   8 0.104** 0.022 0.005 23.100 1.988 0.001; 0.207  34.633*** 4 
           Low uncertainty avoidance 3737   8 0.009 0.002 0.002 93.280 0.585 -0.023; 0.043    8.576 - 
             Voluntary 5289   15 0.043 0.009 0.003 31.510 1.721 -0.006; 0.092 49.880*** - 
Mandatory   545     4 0.059 0.009 0.007 79.430 1.246 -0.034; 0.153    5.035 5 
Excluding financial sector 5079 13 0.056** 0.009 0.002 27.130 2.075 0.003; 0.108 47.923***  
Financial sector   261   2 -0.040*** 0.000 0.007 100.000 -10.087 -0.047; -0.032   0.008 1 
Mixed 266   4 -0.006 0.008 0.015 100.000 -0.151 -0.094; -0.080    2.133 - 
           ROE 2682   5 0.004 0.000 0.002 100.000 0.452 -0.015; 0.024   1.383 - 
ROA 3318 13 0.056* 0.014 0.004 28.590 1.742 -0.007; 0.119 45.466***  - 
Risk factor (D)           
Overall meta-analysis 17222 20 0.054*** 0.004 0.001 28.500 3.825 0.026; 0.082 70.147*** 16 
Moderating  factors           
Civil law   5784  5 0.043** 0.003 0.001 38.990 2.065 0.002; 0.084 15.390***  3 
Common law 10207 10 0.053*** 0.003 0.001 31.280 3.009 0.018; 0.087 31.966*** 12 
High uncertainty avoidance   6465  8 0.065** 0.007 0.001 16.940 2.179 0.006; 0.124 47.212*** 10 
           Low uncertainty avoidance 9707  9 0.045*** 0.002 0.001 47.750 3.065 0.016; 0.073 18.921***  3 
           
Voluntary 12886 13 0.059*** 0.004 0.001 21.660 3.155 0.022; 0.096 60.005*** 19 
Mandatory   4336   7 0.039** 0.002 0.001 78.790 2.302 0.006; 0.072   8..884   1 
Excluding financial sector 12295 14 0.055*** 0.004 0.001   27.220 3.237 0.022; 0.089 51.423*** 15 
Financial     262    2 0.101 0.007 0.007 100.000 1.741 -0.012; 0.216 1.831 - 
Mixed   4665   4 0.048 0.003 0.001   24.770 1.643 -0.009; 0.105 16.146***   2 
Beta 1597 11 0.081** 0.010 0.007   64.113 2.256 0.010; 0.153 17.153***   6 
Standard deviation of return   571  2 0.229*** 0.002 0.003 100.000 6.339 0.158; 0.300   1.664   4 
Loss and Z-score 15035  6 0.045*** 0.002 0.000   19.790 2.468 0.009; 0.081 30.324***    5 
 
 Notes: Notes: Dependent variable:  risk disclosure; ROA: net profit/total assets; ROE:  net profit/equity. * p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 
 
